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St. Louis Plays Host To
Student Bar Convention
By Charles Langer

The Past and -

William Mitchell -1961
By Allen Lamkin

From the dawn of civilization to
Across the river in Minneapolis,
the present day man's relationship four more colleges followed in
with his fellow man has become rapid succession. These were The
increasingly cc.rerl~x. La-v, which Minneapoils College o::: !.a.;·,,·, Th.:;
governs this relationship between I Minnesota College of Law, The
men, has progressed along with this Northwestern College of Law, and
change in society, and those who the Y.M.C.A., which at that time
specialize in the law have found offered a legal curriculum.
that the preparation which was
In the late 1920's, The Northsufficient for the legal profession western College of Law merged
yesterday will not suffice today.
with The Minneapolis College of
Early American life and society Law, and the Y.M.C.A. law school
were relatively uncomplex. Its laws merged with The Minnesota Colwere, by our standards, few and lege of Law. These two schools,
simple. It was possible in the early The Minneapolis College of Law
1800's for a young American with and The Minnesota College of Law,
only a few years of formal educa- existed along with The St. Paul
tion to read law for two years and College of Law until 1940, when
acquire a degree at twenty, be- the two colleges in Minneapoils
come attorney general of his state merged to form The Minneapolisat twenty-three, a United States Minnesota College of Law. The
Representative at twenty-nine, a prime mover in these mergers was
United States senator a thirty, the decrease in student enrollment
and a Justice of the Tennessee Su- occasioned by the two World Wars
preme Court at thirty-one. Andrew and the great depression.
Jackson, uneducated by our standAs a result of negotiations which
ards, went on, in like manner, to began in 1955, the two remaining
become a Major General at thirty- night law schools were brought tofive and the seventh President of gether in the final merger which
the United States.
resulted in the establishment of
As the nation grew older and the William Mitchell College of
the area became better settled, Law.
the level and ability of the backIn September, 1958, a new buildwoods lawyer began to rise. A few ing was completed and the two
day law schools were established, groups, comprising over 400 stubut it was still possible in the dents, were brought together for
early 1900's for a young man to the first time under one roof to
become a lawyer by passing the attend lectures presented by one
bar examination after having faculty. The William Mitchell Colworked as an apprentice for sev- lege of Law thus became the seceral years under an established ond largest accredited law school
lawyer.
in the United States having classes
In the late 1890's a group of exclusively in the evening and the
lawyers and judges met in St. Paul only night law school in the upper
to consider the establishment of a midwest.
night law school. A school of this
In 1900, when the first night law
type would enable those who were school was established in Minneunable to attend day law school to sota, the requirement for admisacquire a legal education. It was sion was a high school diploma. In
hoped that the Honorable William 1930 this requirement was raised
Mitchell, who had recently retired to one year of college work, and by
from the Minnesota Supreme Court, 1952 the requirement had reached
could be enlisted as Dean of the three years of college preparation.
new college. Justice Mitchell, how- Today over ninety per cent of the
ever, died in August, 1900. The St. students attending the William
Paul College of Law opened in Mitchell College of Law hold bachSeptember of that year.
elors' degrees.

I

I was very fortunate in being able to attend the 13th Annual Meeting of the American Law Student Association from August 5 to August 10, 1961, in St. Louis, Missouri, as the voting delegate from the
Student Bar Association of William Mitchell College of Law. The host
school was Washington University, and its Student Bar Association,
The January Inn, acted as the host committee. Highlights of the meeting ranged from an Orientation Workshop to the ALSA "Founders
Day" luncheon.
The Orientation Workshop was
cans enjoy today came from
an innovation for annual meetings.
the Creator and not the State,
Here the delegates were introas was evident to our forefa.
duced to the activities of the
thers when they wrote the
ALSA. President Dan Batchelor
Declaration of Independence.
presided at the workshop, at which
They promised that we would
the various national ALSA offidefend these rights in whatcers, the members of the Host
ever way necessary. One of the
School Committee, and the comways advocated by Seymour is
mittee chairmen were presented to
a wider use of international
the assembled delegates .
law to form a durable and lastThe American Bar Association
ing peace throughout the
Assembly Session, held in the Civic
world. He emphasized that this
Opera House, Kiel Auditorium, was
was not an "egghead" concept,
a very interesting and impressive
but is a part of the lawyer's
function of the ABA. After the
duty to help maintain law and
welcome by Governor John M.
peace.
Dalton of Missouri and the reHe was of the belief that the
sponse by Judge W. St. John Garner of Texas, many distinguished Soviet Union will not support this
guests were introduced. Among program until it is forced to do so
these were Justice Tom Clark of by world opinion. It is our duty to
the U. S. Supreme Court, the help strengthen favorable opinion
Master of the Rolls of England, the for a strong program of internaPr-,:,~inent of the Canadian Ba.:r As· tional law. for this is the hope of
sociation, the President of the In- weak and underprivileged counter-American Law Association, and
our own ALSA President, Dan
Batchelor. All members of ALSA
who were present were recognized.
The highlight of this ABA opening session was the annual report
of President Whitney North Sey.
mour. He first stressed the brotherhood of the law profession, including the lawyer-teacher relationOn September 11, 1961, 129 young
ship, the young and the old and men and women received four year
the judge-practitioner association. sentences in St. Paul. Once again
He emphasized that the most im- the defense, "ignorance of the law,"
portant thing in our judiciary sysproved inadequate. For their comtem today is the independent
mon crime, gross ignorance, they
Bench and Bar. This greatly disare now doing time at William
tinguishes the free countries of
the world from countries domin- Mitchell. A number of those senated by domestic or foreign dicta- tenced will receive time off for bad
torships. He added that in fact, behavior.
To more effectively aid in tl:e
when the Communists first start to
take over a country, the first thing rehabilitation of this group, so they
which is eliminated is the inde- may again take their places as rependence of the Bench and Bar. spected members of society, we
He urged that the one thing which must learn a few facts about them.
Those sentenced range from 21
every lawyer can do to help preserve our great country is to help to 47, averaging 26 years of age.
maintain confidence in the courts. They come from various parts of
the continent, from Alabama to
President
Sey,mour
also
Manitoba, and from Maine to Nestressed that the great rights
and liberties which we Ameribraska. One quarter of those rep~ - -- - -- - - - -- -- . resented were from outside of
Minnesota.
Dean To Continue
Three young ladies are included
It has been announced by
in the group, two of whom have
Andrew N. Johnson, President
attended institutions outside the
of the Board of Trustees of
William Mitchell, that Dean
United States. One of these is an
Stephen R. Curtis has been
English teacl:er and another is a
asked to continue his duties at
receptionist.
William Mitchell after expiraOf the men involved, 60 percent
tion of the original four year
are married. Their children number
contract of 1958.
from zero to eight. The average
In announcing the Dean's acstudent has 1.47 children including
ceptance, President Johnson
1.3, 0.6, and 1.8 in three cases.
said, "We feel that Dean Curtis
Educationwise, those incarcerated
has been dedicated to the task
possess
excellent backgrounds.
of building William Mitchell
Ninety-five percent have one or
College of Law into one of the
more degrees, representing 31 colimportant institutions of legal
leges and universities.
learning in the country, and
Student occupations vary widely.
we are happy that he is willing
They include one CPA, three teachto continue in that work."
ers, three Air Force personnel, one

tries. The president's last comment
was that keeping the fortitude and
steadfastness which our forefathers
exhibited so well will bring us
through once more.
Another interesting and instructive presentation of the ABA was
the Conference on Personal Finance Law, presented by the Junior Bar Conference, which produced argument of a legal question regarding consumer finance
important to businessmen and consumers. The counsel selected from
the Junior Bar Conference by its
officers were: Attorneys for the
Plaintiff-Appellee, William R. Cogar, of Richmond, Virginia, and C.
Paul Jones from our own Twin
Cities. Attorneys for the Defendant-Appellant were Carl W. Nielsen, H·artford, Connecticut, and
John G. Weinmann of New Orleans, Louisiana. The Chief Justice
of the moot Appellate Court was
Chief Justice Laurance Hyde of
the Supreme Court of the State
of Missouri. One of the Associate
Judges was Fred J. Moreau, Dean
of the University of Kansas Law
School. The other Associate Judge
was Robert G. Storey, Jr., of Dallas, Tex2s.
(Continued On Page 2)

Three Portias

Freshmen Begin
Four-Year 'Terms'
Naval officer, one basketball coach,
seventeen insurance men, several
chemists and engineers, and many
business and banking specialists.
Representatives of fields related
to law are one Internal Revenue
Agent, one U.S. Marshal, two tax
examiners, tl:ree law clerks, four
patent trainees, five deputy or assistant clerks of court, and two
who are employed by the West
Publishing Company.
In the realm of accomplishment
the group has several notables.
These include: Harry Sieben, U.S.
Marshal and former Minnesota
Highway Safety and Liquor Control
Commissioner; Ron Johnson, former Gopher "great" and presently
assistant basketball coach at the
University of Minnesota; Commander Arpad Toth, U.S. Navy
pilot; and Major Richard Chrysler,
U.S. Air Force.
Business tycoons included are:
Aaron White, who became president of his own chemical manufacturing firm at age 23; and Robert Hillstrom, who is president and
general manager of a realty firm.
Accomplishments in other fields
were made by Gilbert Richey, Jr.,
who has attended Purdue, Butler,
and the University of Minnesota
and who, incidentally, is the father
of eight cl:ildren.
May the forthcoming experiences
be beneficial to those involved, and
may it be not too much to bear for
the innocent wives and children of
those sentenced.
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The Students Speak -

Challenge To The Bar
Any discussion these days of "professional responsibility" ends up on
a note of "let's raise the standards of the bar". Certainly this is an innocuous objective, even if it does state it's own conclusion. But if this
is a desirable goal it is also a poor place to stop, for as one goes into
the problem of "how to" achieve it he runs into a plethora of practical
economic problems which face the legal profession, as a profession,
today. So what appears to be an item of legal ideals turns out to be a
facade which hides the real intent and purpose of the statement, which
is to reduce the numbers in, or coming into, the profession. This intent
is based in turn on fear that the bar is "overcrowded" and the false
corrolary that legal incomes suffer because of it.
We say false because the matter of legal income is a complex collateral issue. It rests in part on the fact that country lawyers are trying
to live off a "geographic pie" which won't support them very well,
while the metropolitan lawyer is living off an "economic pie" that will.
As for the other part, it rests on false economic doctrines which the
legal profession assumes will do the job; the "toothache" income theory,
the "collection plate" theory, the "winner take all" adversary system,
and the penurious disposition of money by governments and business.
These are the real roots of the laWYers' income and income distribution
problems, not just simply "overcrowding".
We fail to see where a reduction in the Hennepin-Ramsey county
bars would produce more business writing prospectuses in Lake County,
or vice versa. As for improving legal incomes by improving legal competence, Darrow himself would have trouble getting enough personal
injury suits against railroads in a good many Minnesota counties to
make more than a pittance. Perhaps it is all right if the small town
medical GP goes out of business, along with the small acreage farmer,
but country laWYers following the same trend are more than removers
of boils and sowers of wheat: their contributions to communitv existence cannot be readily or adequately replaced from service · at a
distant point. A loss here is a total loss to the social roots of our existence, and the trend here can create only less than "minimum legal
care" for a significant number of people.
On this basis, it won't be necessary for the bar to worry about legal
population or legal income. The law of supply and demand will take
care of both these problems, until, like the engineers, the onslaught
will be upon them. Then what is the bar going to do about standards?
After all, it takes a good many years to make a competent attorney, and
we can rightfully assume they will be needed to serve the great increase in adult population which will occur in the next ten years, regardless of where these people decide to live.
But if the general facts point to an actual future "shortage" of
trained legal personnel, there is a startling lack of ec:"onomic studies
in depth as to the future needs of the bar. There is in fact no Bureau
of Legal Economics on the national level set up to do the job, as was
pointed out by Reginald Smith in the American Bar Journal, Vol. 46,
p. 483 and p. 1201. This means we do not have so much a problem of
"raising standards" as creating them, because, until someone puts together enough statistical information to create a per capita-geographic
numeric standard, any argument about there being "too many laWYers"
will have to rest on the scanty information available. And unless this
is done as a. national effort, the only result we can hope to accomplish
is a plague of local surpluses and national shortage, the ever-present
spector of want in the midst of plenty.
Since we do not have the resources to create such statistical evidence,
and it is the bar which has asserted the position of "overcrowding", we
say the burden of proof must rightly and heavily fall on it. We certainly can't hope to create any realistic standards without such facts
and we refute the allegation that we can continue to live on testimoniai
evidence. This is our challenge to the bar.

ALUMNI ARE REQUESTED
TO SEND THEIR CORRECT
ADDRESS TO SCHOOL Of.
FICE.
ALUMNI ATTENTION:
Please send information about
yourself, or other Alumni, to:
WILLIAM MITCHELL
OPINION
2100 Summit Avenue
St. Paul 5, Minnesota
We want to print news about
YOU!
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o~portun~ty to become acquainted
with their fellow classmates and
faculty members and learn more
.about the Fraternity.
On November 11 Ramsey Senate
sponsored an all-school dance
which was held at the University
Club. Over 100 couples enjoyed
the melody of the Bill Bright
Orchestra and danced to their
music from 9 until 1 a.m.
Starting at 2 o'clock on November 11 Delta Theta Phi initiated
approximately 15 new members,
who had been pledged previously
at an October 31 smoker. After the
initiation all of the actives of the
Fraternity were entertained at a
steak supper served by the University Club. The Senate was
privileged to have the Honorable
Donald P. Barbeau as guest speaker and Patrick W. Fitzgeral<l, Master of Ceremonies.
The Senate tentatively plans to
hold a joint smoker with Mitchell

Senate of the University of Minnesota in December and two smokers for members of the Fraternity,
in the spring of 1962.

Foster Appointed To
ALSA Committee
The American Law Student
Association has announced the
appointment of Thomas A. Foster, fourth-year student, to the
committee on World Peace
Through Law.
This committee will work on
an expansive program during
the year, giving special attention to the newly adopted
foreign student program.

(Continued From Page 1)
John Vojtech, President of the
Canadian Law Student Association,
was in attendance during the entire meeting. He brought greetings from his association and made
mention of the ALSA assistance
given to the Canadian Association.
He stated that his organization is
still in its formative years and
suggested to the delegates that a
closer contact with Canadian law
schools be maintained, particularly
in the fields of debating and moot
court competition.
At the Host School breakfast, an
mteresting and inspiring talk on
the subject of Defending Unpopular Causes and Clients was presented by Morris Shenker, an attorney from St. Louis. Mr. Shenker
had emigrated to St. Louis from
Russia when he was sixteen years
old. He attended St. Louis University where he received both his
B.A. and LL.B. degrees. He has
served as Judge of the Court of
Criminal Correction and also lectured at the University of Texas.
Dean Lesar, of the Washington
Kenneth Mitchell University Law School, when introducing Mr. Shenker, described him
as "a man with a heart."
Prof. Nadler
Shenker stated that criminal lawyers would never win any populariRecovering
ty contests. He feels it is unfortuProfessor Charles E. Nadler, nate that most attorneys shy away
who has been visiting professor from defending unpopular causes
at William Mitchell since 1958, and clients. Shenker pointed out
was expected to return this fall that although it is sometimes hard
for a full teaching assignment. on the individual and even his
Instead, he was drafted fur an family, he still feels that attorneys
unexpected term in a New York of America are not performing
hospital last summer. He is mak- their duties to themselves, their
ing a full recovery at his home bars and the Constitution of the
in Macon, Georgia, and it is United States if they do not enhoped he and Mrs. Nadler will gage in this type of work. When
soon be teading again to the an accused person is on trial he is
already at a disadvantage. He has
north country.
been arrested, interrogated and

By The Dean

I

No doubt the recent development of most far-reachmg rmportance to
· th e st reng th emng
· of our f acul ty by t h e add"1t10n
· of several
our sch oo l 1s
· t ed m
· t h"1s issue
·
· · They
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·
d
·
·
·
a mixture of maturity, experience and accom. h men t , an d a1so th e en th us1asm
·
· · of youth. They
p1IS
an d eager curiosity
·
h
d
·
come wit a variety of e ucat1onal backgrounds from some of the best
colleges and law schools. Everyone who has met these new teachers is
sure that the school has taken another sound step in the endless
process of enriching the instruction of our students.
Our enrollment at the beginning of the semester was again over
400. This year the percentage of beginning students who have college
degrees is 95, as compared with 90% in recent years. The military
build-up that started in the late summer kept a number of men from
enrolling. The build up has been accomplished, not by increasing the
drafting of men with no military experience, but by re-activating older
men who have had some active service and are now in the reserves.
This has affected an age bracket that involves not only men contemplating entering a school such as ours, where the average entering age is
26 or 27 years, but it has also forced several of our upperclassmen to
withdraw from school during this semester.
The commencement address last June by Judge E. Barret Prettyman
was such a gem that the William Mitchell Opion is taking the unusual
step in printing it in full. Whether you were present at commencement
or not, you will enjoy reading it.
As this is written, we have just been assured of another great
Commencement program for next June 12. Judge Herbert F.
Goodrich of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has agreed to be our Commencement speaker. He is a native
of Anoka, Minnesota, a graduate of Carleton College and Harvard
University Law School, a former member of the law faculties at the
Universities of Iowa, Michigan and Pennsylvania, and, in addition
to having served since 1940 as a distinguished federal judge, he has
for many years been the Director of the American Law Institute.
Those of you who have not yet heard him speak will be glad to
know of another of his qualifications. He is a brilliant and witty
speaker. William Mitchell is appreciative and pround of the high
caliber of its Commencement speakers.

The William Mitchell Opinion, which made its first appearance in
May, 1959, has, in that short span, accomplished so much for the school
by keeping students, alumni and friends all over the country informed
and interested in what is going on at the school that we should not be
surprised when the publication brings us another dividend; but some
of us have not yet recovered from the excitement of one recent occurrence. Last June I received a letter from Howard W. Babcock, an
alumnus of the class of 1941. Mr. Babcock is United States Attorney
at Las Vegas, Nevada. He wrote:
"In the May 1961 William Mitchell Opinion, I note that you have
a display case in your library for rare law books.
"While in England during World War II, I purchased a fourvolume set of Blackstone's Commentaries. Volumes I and II were
published in 1770; Volume Ill, in 1768, and Volume IV, in 1769.
Volumes Ill and IV are first editions. If you would care to display
this four-volume work, I would be most pleased to present it to ·my
alma mater by way of gift.
"May I hear from you at your pleasure."

His offer was of course accepted with enthusiasm and appreciation.
We recently received the four volumes, which are in excellent condition. Two of the volumes are, indeed, first editions. They make a most
valued addition to our collection of rare volumes. We welcome this opportunity to express the gratitude of the William Mitchell College of
Law to this generous alumnus.
Are there other alumni with rare books?
confined without benefit of counsel.
Usually, the man is not familiar
with the legal principles involved;
he probably hasn't much money
and consequently many times cannot obtain "competent" counsel.
Shenker predicts the time will arrive in the not too distant future
when large law firms will have excellent criminal laWYers in the firm
as well as those specializing in
such fields as taxation and corporations. It is not the duty of the
criminal laWYer to help convict the
accused. There is no such thing as
a guilty person until the competent
person or persons make that decision, who will be the judge or the
jury, depending on the circumstances. The attorney should never
pass judgment on his client, and if
he does, he is denying his client
rights under the Constitution of the
United State. Shenker emphasized
that even though an attorney's
family may suffer, it is his duty as
a laWYer to accept this type of employment. If he does not, there will
be a real breakdown of law enforcement.
The professional seminar in
"Medical Malpractice in Today's
Society" provided a distinguished
panel, which explored the various
facets of this most important interprofessional area.
The Association has grown from
46 Charter Member student bar
associations to 130 member associations in twelve short years. The

highhght of the business of the
meeting was the adoption of the
indvidual law student membership
proposal of the ALSA Board of
Governors.
The
newly-elected
Board of Governors was charged
with the responsibility and duty
of implementing the individual law
student membership program in
1962. The adoption of the individual
membership
proposal
amounted to a great change in
purpose of the Association - going from an association whose
membership was limited to school
student bar associations to an association made up of individual law
students as well as student bar
associations. It is expected that
many more advantages will accrue
to the individual law student as a
result of this change in purpose
of the ALSA, thereby adding to
the professional growth of each
individual member.
It is my sincere recommendation that more delegates from each
member law school be permitted
to attend the 1962 annual meeting
to be held in San Francisco next
August, and future annual meetings. The quality of the national
organization, the caliber of the
delegates, and the hard work involved in preparing seminars,
workshops, and discussion groups
cannot but help inspire the delegates and members with regard to
the fine work and purpose of the
American Law Student Association.
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AS I SEE IT

THE LAW
By Hon. E. Barrett Prettyman
Following is the address in full which was presented at the 1961
William Mitchell commencement exercises by the Hon. E. Barrett
Prettyman, one of the Judges of the District Court for the District
of Columbia.

they do the best they can with as I see it. Man discovers those
surgery and x-rays and some drugs. rules. Other laws are invented, and
Thus it is quite clear that the this list is long. Corporations, currency, rules of the road, and so on
present wto1e of every science consists of two parts, (1) the applica- indefinitely. We discover in part
tion to daily problems of that which and we invent in part.

The drawing of tte simplest will,
properly approached, is a problem
in human relationships of the most
intricate and delicate sort. A man
wants to leave all his property to
his wife. A flood of questions is
unloosed by that simple idea, if
the lawyer is the scientist he ought
to be. The fact is that the carelessness· with wtich many lawyers permit hard-working, thrifty people
to toss out the window, or into the
outstretched hands of unscrupulous
volunteers posing as advisers or
investors, or into the maw of consuming litigation, the sweatstained
savings of a lifetime is appalling.
An architect who drew plans for a
building with care proportionate to
the sad process of many lawyers
drawing wills would be barred from
practice long before he starved to
death or was prosecuted. The same
is true in respect to tte drawing of
contracts, the trial of lawsuits, and
the argument of cases. The work
of a lawyer is a series of problems,
no two exactly alike, which concern the relationships of human
beings, some simple and some bafflingly complex.

is the best presently known on the
That law is a science, that is, in
subject and (2) the never-ceasing basic part a search for truth, preI am both honored and happy at being here. Of course the extreme search for answers not yet known. supposes, of course, that there are
The never-ceasing search for new true and correct ultimate solutions
honor and pleasure is in tte degree you have announced you will confer
to .the problems of tuman relationupon me. That is a precious possession I shall cherish always. Then I am answers to old problems has two
striking characteristics in the scien- ships. Of that I am firmly conhonored and made happy by the distinction of the group who invited
tific world. One is the persistence vinced. My own belief is that man
me. There were several collaborators - Judge Sanborn, Judge Burger, of the search, and tte other is the was created by an Intelligence, but
Judge Blackmun, President Johnson, Dean Curtis, Mr. Lee Slater of the reluctant caution with which a new even if that were not so, I would
West Publishing Company and Mr. Wayne Davies who is tte official discovery or invention is accepted. still believe that animal-man can
live in a state of maximum wellreporter for our court. I must mention especially Judge Warren Burger, Our friends, the doctors, are ever
pressing for new cures, but they being, that that state is definable,
who now sits with me on the court and who is an alumnus of this school.
are just as skeptical about adopt- that man desires to achieve it, and
I have developed respect, admiration, and a vast affection for him. We ing a new discovery as they are that it is achievable. I do not bedisagree, but I dislike people who always agree; I like men who are keen about making it. Engineers lieve that the human race is conbelligerently in error upon occasion. In the second place I am glad to be and physicists are always seeking demned forever to an existence of
here because you are a night school. I tacked out my law degree in a solutions to the problems of air disturbance, fear, oppression, econight school. I taught public school in the daytime, assisted in coaching flight, but their every discovery nomic want, injustice. There are
athletic teams in the afternoon, and traveled an hour each way every and invention, no matter how true and correct ultimate solutions
evening to get that precious parchment. The day sctool boys un- eagerly hailed, is subjected to long to tte problems of human relationdoubtedly have more chance to learn the law, and so I suppose they grueling tests before it is offered ships.
Thus, as I see it, an important
really do learn more than we did; but one thing I assert - those of us for use. The scientific way of acto whom each evening's lectures and quizzes were an agony of accom- cepting a new answer is to try it basic part of the practice, the teachplishment, prized more highly each morsel of instruction ttat was out experimentally until it has ing, and the administration of the
offered us, each sub-item of the law that was unveiled to us, each hour been proven. Tt.is balance between law is a search for better answers.
We could go on with other comthat moved us closer to membership at the bar. Of course the boys who zealous searching for the new and The law is not merely that which
mon
features of the systems known
caution
in
its
adoption
is
a
charmust earn their living while taking daytime courses stare this glorious
has been established. The corporasense with us. But, however much we share it, it is still ours and I, for acteristic of the truly scientific tion, monogamy, and due process as sciences and the system of the
one, glory in it. One thing about your Bulletin puzzled me. What on method.
of law once were new. Something law. The thesis I submit to you is
that tte law is not dead; it is alive.
earth did you do with Wednesday evenings? Georgetown made us attend
Now, let us look at the law, its new tas been added to the law
The
law is no more dead than is
all five evenings. And in the last place I am happy to be here because, characteristics and its difficulties. from time to time, because the
while your school is named for your great Justice William Mitchell, The law deals with human rela- seeking mind of man discovered or physics, or chemistry, or astronowt.om of course I did not know as a younger lawyer, I watched his son tionships. These are many and var- invented a better rule for the serv- my, or geology, or biology. The law
from a distance during his tour of duty in Washington. He ranked in my ied. There are the relationships ice of man's well-being. That proc- is not an ancient language like
book with the greatest at the bar of these times - John W. Davis, New- between man and man, between ess has not ceased. The mind of classic Greek, the conjugation of
ton D. Baker, Charles Evans Hughes, Herbert Pope. I thank you from man and woman, among groups of man has not atrophied. Quite the the improper verbs of which is to
be learned by rote and repeated
the bottom of my heart for letting me be here.
people, the family, partnerstips, contrary, more and more men,
parrot-like in answers to questions.
corporations, and finally govern- more and more actively, more and
I submit as my subject "The Law the fantastic notion that man might ments, small and great. They re- more intelligently, are seeking an- It is not even a delightful literature of the past to be read for in-As I See It." I shall submit sev- fly faster than sound. So we migtt volve about people and property, swers to the problems in this vast
terest and studied for style. The
eral propositions, principally two. go on indefinitely. Scientific knowl- actions and events. They involve labyrinth.
law is the process of dealing with
edge
consists
of
currently
accepted
an infinite variety of facts. They
The first is an affirmation. Tt.e law,
I interject that the adoption of actual, present, live problems of
scientific fact and theory.
is the are utterly simple and unutterably
that which is newly discovered or human beings and tt.eir activities.
as I see it, is a science, a part of
best we know to date, but some of complex. These relationships must
the science of human relationships. it is true and some of it is not true. be arranged and controlled, lest invented in the law should be with Full comprehension of the law is
the same caution as that with which not acquired by memory; the law
Now, before you reject that propo- Science is the search for thiµ which chaos be complete. To that end
scientists in other fields accept the requires the application of active,
there must be rules. Those rules
sition as obviously absurd, permit is true.
new. The adoption of a new solu- living intelligence to the raw maare the law. The law consists of a
me to develop it. Let us look first
tion after rights have accrued fre- terial of people and events.
The next characteristic I note is
body of rules which govern reat some of the characteristics of
quently involves a denial of a right
that some scientific facts are dis- lationships.
The whole of the law is the
science· and then at the law. The
already established, but an estabcovered and some are created by
whole of the truth as to human
first and basic characteristic of
The difficulties and problems of lished rule may in the course of
man. Electricity was discovered,
relationships. Thus, tt.e whole of
science is that it is a search for
but the generation of electricity by tte law are pretty much the same the years, by the occurrence of the law consists of two parts. One
truth. Sometimes it is said that
a whirling armature in a magnetic as those of other sciences. We know events and ctange of customs, etc., is the daily application of the best
science is truth, but ttat is merely
field and the conduction of the quite a bit, but we know that we become an instrument of injustice that is known to date; and the
a pleasant arrogance of lesser sci- energy by copper wire to a light do not know so much more. We rather than of justice. This capacity
other, equally important, part is
entists. The dictionaries say science
bulb are scientific facts wtich were have discovered true answers to for change is one of the proud the unremitting search for new
is systemized knowledge, but
invented by man. The facts of na- many problems. Thievery and mur- features of our common law sys- and better answers. The lawyer,
"knowledge" in that definition inture have existed from the creation der are certainly wrong. We know tem. My point here is that keen
cludes opinion and theory as well of the earth. The raw material for that unfettered power of any sort search for the new and better and the law teacher and the judge are
under two obligations. One is to
as certainty. Much of accepted
radio waves existed in the time of is dangerous and we seek to pre- extreme caution in adopting the apply daily tt.e best we know to
scientific fact is false. Science as
the Babylonian Empire, and so did vent it. We know that for nations new are not inconsistent. Together
the real scientists know, is basi- the natural phenomena which sup- to settle their differences of opin- they constitute the truly scientific date. The other and equal duty is
cally a search for truth. What is port an airplane. Penicillin has al- ion or of interest by slaughtering process; in the law as in every to search unceasingly for better
answers than we now know. Both
currently called scientific fact is ways existed. But of course such their prime specimens of physical other science.
are living processes.
really no more than the best belief facts do not become part of science and mental excellence is obviously
Of course, the most important
of the moment. Much of it is not until they are discovered. Science an incorrect rule, but we do not
And now I come to another phase
really true because the scientists takes eitter or both of two courses, seem to be able to establish a co~- part of practice and administra- of my subject. We have an expreshave not yet learned the truth as the discovery of natural truth or rect rule. We do pretty well in tion of tte law, time-wise and
money-wise, is the daily application sion of which we are very fond and
to so very many matters. Illustra- the production of new facts.
many areas but not very well in
of the best we currently know. But very proud. It is "government by
tions troop to mind. In 1490 the
others. We know full well that we
law." What does that mean, as I
Scientists in their daily work do not know the answers to many that is not a Univac operation. A
scientific fact was that the earth is
see it? A law is a rule. The Oxford
robot
cannot
practice
law
any
more
flat; Columbus was a scientific ec- must do the best they can with of our problems. Tte prevention of
Dictionary
says Law means "The
centric. Fifty years ago the chem- what they know, even though they crime, the control of commerce, the than it can practice medicine or
body of rules, whetter proceeding
build
houses.
The
day-by-day
pracistry books taught ttere are ninety- realize the imperfections of their distribution of goods, as, for exfrom formal enactment or from
two irreducible species of matter, knowledge. For example, engineers ample of food, the ownership of tice, and also the administration, of
custom, which a particular state or
the
law
consists
of
reaching
live
called elements. The present no- building airplanes must do the best property, the problems of the
community
recognizes as binding
tion, as you all know, is that all ttey can with what they know. juvenile, the indigent, the incompe- solutions to living problems. Cases
on
its
members
or subjects." Then
matter is composed of electric They would like very much to land tent are unsolved problems. The are not quiz program questions the
"government by law" means govanswers
to
which
are
in
a
book
the
plane
straight
down,
or
start
it
charges and the various species of
rules of the air and of space and of
ernment by rules. It means we
matter are merely varieties of num- straight up, or have it hover mo- atomic energy are not yet discov- somewhere. They are problems,
formulate and adopt rules and then
mostly
having
to
do
with
tte
reber and arrangement of the charges tionless, but they do not as yet ered. We know that fifty different
govern by applying those rules. As
in atoms. Until very recent years know how, except to the limited sets of rules in one nation for the lationships of human beings. A dithe Dictionary definition indicates,
vorce
is
not
a
compendium
of
plamedical authorities, including the capacity of the present design of a relationship of husband and wife is
sometimes rules are made by a lawpharmacopoeias, said that nicotinic helicopter and of dirigibles. Zoolo- a wrong system. The list of our un- giarized papers and stereotyped
making body created for that purpronouncements.
It
is
a
complex
acid is deadly poison. But today it gists would like very much to elim- solved problems is well-nigh limitproblem of human relationships, pose. Sometimes they are made by
is recognized as one of the vitamins inate Japanese Beetles and the less. And we know it.
the intricacies .o f human behavior, our common-law system, which
and we take a bit every day. Physi- Mexican Bean Bugs, but they do not
the requirements of a pressing so- means that a given rule has for so
As
is
tte
case
with
most
other
as
yet
know
how.
So
they
must
do
cians bled President George Washlong and so often appealed to the
ington with leeches. One of tte the best they can with poisons in sciences, the law is in part dis- ciety, the future of children, etc.,
sense of right and justice of many
etc.
A
will
is
not
a
jumble
of
uncharges against General Billy limited areas, quarantines, inspec- covered and in part invented. There
people tl:at it becomes established
Mitchell (no kin to your William tions and other makeshifts, the best are in the law, as I see it, certain intelligible Seventeenth Century
as a rule of law, and is so declared
Mitchell, I believe) for which he they know. The medicoes are fran- natural rules. Many basic rights obscurities taken from a book. A
by the judges.
was court-martialed was that he at- tic to stop, destroy, eradicate can- are natural; many moral strictures will is usually the climactic act of
(Continued On Page 4)
tempted to foist upon the Army cer, but they do not know how. So are natural. This is a moral world, a person's whole lifetime effort.

President Johnson, Dean Curtis, Ladies and Gentlemen:

n
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gence; and, if he cannot, he cannot
recover no matter how morally
certain it may be his opponent was
(Continued From Page 3)
at fault. A plaintiff who neglects to
bring his action within the statuOnce a rule is made, the duty of dom of speech or not, as it pleased, tory period loses. And so on into
executive officers and of judicial you would have no freedom of more complicated fields .
officers in our system is to carry speech. Our courts are bound by
A reference to baseball may illusout that rule. They have no other rules to uphold your rights. Witt.trate the point. That a man gets
duty or authority. You may some- out rules there are no rights.
tl:.ree strikes and no more and that
times hear the term "judicial disNext let us note that in every a fly ball which lands outside cercretion." Chief Justice John Marshall said many years ago: "Judi- controversy there are at least two tain lines is foul are fixed by rules.
cial power, as contradistinguished parties, adversaries, usually active, The umpire applies the rules. He
from the power of the laws, tas no sometimes merely potential but does not say, "Well, this batter is
existence. Courts are the mere in- nevertheless real. In a civil action a little fellow and a rookie, and
struments of the law, and can will there are plaintiff and defendant. that pitcher is a veteran and rich
nothing. When they are said to In a criminal case there are the and mean. I'll call this next one a
exercise a discretion, it is a mere accused and the state, the people. ball whether or no." What is harsh
legal discretion, a discretion to be Justice, as I see it, is the balance for the batter is good for the
exercised in discerning the course of right as between the two sides. pitcter, and contrariwise. The ump
prescribed by law; and, when that It is not the service of tte interest pays no attention to that. He govis discerned, it is the duty of the or the benefit of either one side or erns according to the rules exactly
Court to follow it. Judicial power the other. In our system the justice as they are written. The justice of
is never exercised for the purpose of a given situation is predeter- the situation is written in the rule
of giving effect to the will of the mined objectively by a rule. When itself. This is what we mean by
Judge; always for tte purpose of thereafter a factual situation arises government by law.
giving effect to the will of the justice is done by applying the
This basic doctrine applies to
Legislature; or, in other words, to rule. Justice is not done by ad hoc judges in all phases of judicial
evaluation of personalities, circumthe will of the law." 1
duty - whether deciding a case,
stances or emotions.
ruling on evidence, instructing a
This system of ours is in direct
People sometimes use the word jury, acting on petitions or moantithesis to another system in
vogue in some places on the earth, "justice" to mean gentleness, tions, or voting on appeals. Absent
and sometimes discussed approv- mercy, a benign consideration. flexibility in the applicable law, a
ingly and even sometimes followed Here we must note a difference judge has no power to try to do
in this country. That theory is that between the justice which may be what he l:.appens to think is best
a judge, having a dispute before embodied in a rule of law itself or better for one or the other of
t.im for decision, ought to do what- and the justice involved in the ad- the two opposing sides before him.
ever seems to him just and right ministration of fr.at law. In mak- If a law is not just, the law itself
and pr.oper at the moment. I con- ing a rule the law-makers may well, should be changed. Of course, a
fidently assert to you that such is and frequently do, incorporate dis- judge may have difficulty in decidtinctions of age, economic condi- ing what the law on a given point
not our system.
tion, citizenship, sex and many is and judges may, and do, disagree
Let me try to make plain the other circumstances. They often on that. But once the applicable
matter as I see it. Of course, if all put in a law a degree of flexibility. rule of law is ascertained, it must
men who come to the bench were They may be merciful, benign, be applied. To that end, among
wise, independent, impartial and gentle. But in our system, the ad- others, we l:ave Appellate Courts.
without causes or predilections, it ministration of the law is a differmight be well to leave all disputes ent matter altogether. At this stage,
Quite frequently the application
to their unfettered fiat. But not all the law, whatever it is, governs. of a rule to a given situation cannot
judges are so. Our ancestors long Justice at this stage is the applica- be justified by rationalization. Thus,
ago decided it best to have rules, tion of the rule. This justice is if a rule requires a given act to be
and to bind all government officers cold, utterly objective, impartial, done within thirty days, it is imby those rules. If you think about impervious to emotion. It is the possible to justify by reasoning
it - put yourselves in tte frame of same for ricl:. and poor, old and alone the invalidity of the act if
mind of the barons before Run- young, male and female, white and done within thirty-one days. If a
nymede for instance, or of the men colored. The law itself may obtain rule says a person cannot vote until
who gathered at Philadelphia and distinctions. But the administrators he has passed his twenty-first birthmade a written Constitution, - you of the law, be they executive offi- day, it is impossible to justify a
will agree with that decision. In cials or judges, can make none. refusal to permit him to vote at
the next place, in our concept of When we say "administration of twenty years and ten months of
things human beings have rights - justice" we really mean, as Chief age. You cannot rationalize a rule
endowed with inalienable rights, Justice Marshall pointed out, the that if tte first baseman's foot is
our forefathers said. Such rights application of the law.
on the bag the runner is out, but if
are part of our natural law; the
the foot is one inch off the bag the
Thus it is that the results of the runner is safe. Whenever you atBill of Rights reminds the federal
government it must not impinge administration of justice in our tempt to rationalize a rule in reupon them. Those basic rights are system is frequently harsh indeed spect to a given factual situation,
rules; and moreover, they can be to one party or tte other. If a will you are likely to be in trouble.
enforced only if there are binding is neither holograph nor witnessed,
Judge Learned Hand relates an
rules requiring their enforcement. it is invalid no matter what the fiincident
concerning Mr. Justice
nancial
plight
of
its
beneficiaries.
If a court could uphold your freeA plaintiff in a civil action for Holmes 2 which is pertinent here.
1 Osborn
v. Bank of the United
• THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, 306States, 22U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 , 866 damages arising from an automobile collision must prove negli- 307 (3d ed. 1960) .
(1824).
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The great Yankee from Olympus
said, as we all know, "I hate justice." What he meant, Judge Hand
opines, was illustrated by this story.
Tte two drove down to the Supreme Court Building one day. As
they parted, Justice Holmes to go
in to a conference of the court,
Judge Hand said, "Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!" Holmes replied
emphatically, "That is not my job.
My job is to play the game acccording to the rules."
One other related phase of this
subject I must mention. You frequently see tabulations, or score
cards, on judges in respect to various causes or social doctrines.
Judge so-and-so voted so many
times last year pro-labor or procriminal or antiseivil rights or propoor man and so on. As I see it,
such tabluations are grossly insulting or ought to be. As I see it, a
poor man is just as likely to be
wrong on a point of law as is a
rich man; and conversely a billiondollar corporation is as likely to be
wrong on a point of law as is its
indigent opponent. Neither a labor
union nor a trade association, brilliant thougt their counsel may be
(as indeed they usually are) is invariably correct in its legal positions. Indeed I doubt if they ought
to be; they have causes and interests to advocate and protect. But
the administration of the law knows
no causes or interests, or ought not
to. My own notion on this business
of statistical evaluations of judges
by causes or interests is so strong
that I really believe they are subversive of the administration of
justice.
0

The body of the law stould be
just. The established processes of
the law should be just. But the administration, the application, of the
body of the law and its processes
must be according to the prescriptions of the law and not according
to a court's criteria of justice apart
from the rules.
Why all this on your graduation
nigtt? Because I would have you,
as you enter our great profession,
believe as I do, that the law is a
living process, not a sarcophagus
of mummies, and that "government
by law" is not a tasteless, odorless,
colorless, powerless cliche, but is a
concept of government which is
meaningful, definite, strict, right,
frequently harsh, designed for
strong free men, not for serfs or
the subservient, the best of all systems in the long run. I would, if I
could, prevent your straying off
into marshes and quicksands drawn
by the lure of will-o'-the-wisp
sirens, whispering abstract justice

disembodied from rules. That
ghostly shadow is not our system.
Now may I mention some less
abstruse features of the law as I
see it. I ask myself some questions
and briefly answer them. I shall
not dwell upon them.
Question One: How does one
succeed at the law? Answer: By
work. There is no other road to
success at the law. Sad though it
be, tte fact is that the vast majority of young lawyers do not and
will not work; hence many young
lawyers do not succeed. What do I
mean by work? I mean a grinding
persistence which knows no limits
of time or strength or energy. I
mean effort outside the requirements of one's normal employment. I mean, for example: Learn
to write. Learn to write a sentence
in English which can be understood
and cannot be misunderstood. Can
you write such a sentence? Do you
happen to realize the vastness of
the amount of litigation which concerns only the question of wl:at
somebody meant when he wrote
something?
Statutes, appellate
court opinions, contracts, especially
insurance policies, wills, rules and
regulations. Learn to speak. This is
an art acquired only by hard work.
The gift of gab is a great handicap
to a young lawyer. It sounds well,
but an ebullient orator at a negotiation table or at an appellate
court lectern, is a sad and useless
spectacle. Learn to probe the facts
- not just ascertain them. Learn
to exhaust the authorities - not
just find them, or some of them,
but exhaust them.
Question Two: Is competition
tough in the practice of the law?
Answer: In tl:e first few years, yes_
But if you are a good lawyer the
competition gets less and less as
the years go on.
Question Three: How does one
get clients? Answer: The first
clients come by accident, or by inheritance, or by marriage, or by
way of a firm to which one is attached. After that clients come
from satisfied clients. The secret to
a clientele is a good job well done.
Question Four: What is the
lawyer's greatest art? Answer: Undoubtedly it is clarity. Clear thinking, clear writing, clear speaking.
Question Five: What ability of a
lawyer pays the higtest? Answer:
As in every other profession or
business the highest pay goes to
those who have the ability to make
correct decisions. When I was
young I was told the way to become wealthy was to get a client
who was old and rich and scared.
But a life-time of observation has
(Continued On Page 8)

Wivej Gnterlain al Annual Parl'JBy Beverly Rosenthal

The William Mitchell Law Wives
organization began its third year
of operation with a party at the
school on September 27, to welcome all freshman wives and wives
of transfer students. Seventy three
wives out of a potential 82 attended. Dean Stephen R. Curtis explained the purpose of the group
is "to improve the understanding
of the members of this organization, as wives of law students, of
the problems, ambitions, standards,
and responsibilities .o f law students and of lawyers, to be of assistance in every possible way to
the students and to the law school
and to promote social fellowship
among the William Mitchell Law
Wives." The speaker, Mrs. Phyllis
Jones, 1960 alumna, described the
new experiences in law facing the
students and advised the wives as
to how they can best help their

husbands achieve success in this
field. Chairman of the party, Mrs.
Donald Hassenstab, chose the
school colors, purple and light
blue, to decorate the serving tables.
The first regular meeting of the
club was held October 4, at the
school. Mrs. Hilton Mason gave an
inspiring talk entitled, "Lady and
The Law". Mrs. Mason is a practicing attorney, mother of law stu-

dent James Mason and a grand
spokeswoman for law and life.
Judge Thomas Tallakson, District Court of Hennepin County,
Juvenile Division, spoke on "Troubled Youth of Our Time," at the
November 1 meeting. On December 6, Mr. Glenn, Twin Cities florist, presented a program on Christmas decorations. Wives of Alumni
are welcome and encouraged to
attend the meetings.
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Right To Sue For Prenatal Injury Upheld
By Donald F. Zibell
Fourth year student, William, Mitchell College of Law; Public
Accountant, Bon,lay, Anderson, Waldo and Co.; B.A. degree, University of Minnesota.

difficulty of proving proximate
cause would open the door to
This discussion deals with the purely speculative and fictitious
right of an infant to sue for pre- claims.
natal injuries sustained while nonviable in its mother's womb. Until
recently the unanimous rule of law
Dietrich Case
has been that an infant could not
Any discussion of the developmaintain an action for injuries rement of the law on prenatal inceived before birth.1 In fact, a 1945
juries must begin with Dietrich v.
treatise states the rule as follows:
Inhabitants of Northampton.s This
"At common law and in the abappears to be the first American or
sence of a statute to the contrary,
English case passing on the quesan infant has no right of action for
injuries sustained by him while en tion and it was consistently cited
for over sixty years as authority
ventre sa mere." 2
for denying recovery to infants inRepresentative of the growing jured before birth.9 There the
line of cases that has almost com- court, through Mr. Justice Holmes,
pletely reversed this rule within denied liability to the personal repthe short span of fifteen years is resentative of a child who died a
Sinkler v. Kneale.3 The plaintiff few minutes after birth from prein the Sinkler case was allegedly natal injuries. The child was born
born Mongoloid as the result of in- prematurely four to five months foljuries received in an automobile lowing conception after its mother
collision. The car driven by the in- had fallen on a defective highway
fant's mother was, according to the and miscarried. The decision rested
complaint, negligently struck in on the complete lack of precedent
the rear by the defendant's car. and the concept that before birth
This resulted in injuries to the a child is merely a part of his
mother one month after concep- mother without separate existence
tion of the infant plaintiff.
or personality. The Dietrich case
Relying on an earlier decision,4 arose under a wrongful death statthe Pennsylvania Common Pleas ute and the child was probably
Court sustained defendant's objec- non viable, but its holding has
tions to the complaint and entered been broadened by later courts citjudgment for the defendant, hold- ing it as authority to deny reing that the infant had no cause of covery even where the child suraction. On appeal to the State Su- vives.10
preme Court the decision was reversed and remanded. An infant
Irish Law
may recover in tort for injuries
The second important case on
sustained before it was viable.5 In
reversing its previous holding in the subject was decided in Ireland
the Berlin case the court relied in 1890.11 The case involved a comheavily on the current state of mon carrier and the court decided
medical knowledge that a child is it on contract rather than tort law.
in separate existence from the mo- The infant plaintiff was not alment of conception, and is not lowed to recover for prenatal
merely a part of its mother's body. mJuries because the defendant
The court reviewed the status of carrier had contracted only with
the law in other states and con- the mother and not with the plaincluded that the current trend in tiff. Thus the court avoided the
this country is toward allowing re- separate entity question.
covery for prenatal injuries. AcThe next recorded case on precording to the compilation in the natal injuries was decided by the
case, eighteen states allow recovery, Illinois Supreme Court in 1900.12
four deny it, and another four in- The infant plaintiff was injured
dicate recovery may be possible ten days before birth by a projecunder certain circumstances, but tion from an elevator shaft when
presently deny it. 6
his mother was being transferred
to another floor in the defendant
hospital. Accepting Mr. Justice
Bell Dissents
Holmes' view in the Dietrich case,
In a dissenting opinion,1 Justice the majority held that a child beBell felt compelled by the doctrine fore birth was a part of its mother
of stare decisis to follow the pre- and was only severed from her at
vious decision since he did not be- birth. In a strong dissent, rn Justice
lieve there had been any recent Boggs argued that a viable child
developments in medicine to justify Which could live separably from
a change in the law. Justice Bell the mother had a cause of action,
foresaw adverse effects in allowing and that contrary to Holmes' conthe suit since he believed the next tention a precedent under common
step would be to allow the child to law was not necessary to establish
sue the mother, the doctor, or any- the right.
one else for any failure to use due
care before birth, thus causing By this time there were sufficient
increased litigation and greater precedents to establish the rule of
family discord. Furthermore, the no recovery. Between 1900 and
1946 the highest courts in nine
states considered the question of
prenatal injuries under common
1. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of N orthamp ton. 138 Mass. 14, 62' Am. Ret1. 242 law and all denied a cause of ac-

Early Law

(Sup. JucL Ct. 188-t).
2, 43 C.J.S. ln/CIIl•la §104 (1946).
However, th.a 1961 pocket supplement
reports a chan&"e as follows, " . . . the
modern rule Is that a r:lght o! action
does exist."
3. 401 .Pa.. 267, 164 A . .2d 93 (1960) .
4. Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339
Pa.. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940).
6. Sinkler v. luteale, .t01 Pa. 2'67,
270, 161 A. 2d. 93, 9·6 (1960) .
6. Ill. at 269, IS( A. 2d at 95.
7. Id. a t 270, 164. A . 2d at 96.
8. 138 Mass. H~ 62 .Am.. Rep. 242
(Sup. Jud. Ct. 18~4).
9. See, e.g., Buel v. United Rys. Co.
of St. Louis, 248 Mo. 126, 164 S.W. 71
(191:l); Stemmer Y. Kline, 128 N.J.L.
455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942).
.10. Seez.. e.g. , Lipps v. Milwaukee
El ctric K Y. and Light Co. , 164 Wis.
27?, 169 N .W . 816 (19 16).
11. Walker v. Great Northern Rv.,
28 L.R.Ir. 69 (Q.B. and Ex.Div. 1890).
1.2. Allaire v St Luke's ];Iospital , 184
Il l. 359, 66 N .E . 688 (1900).

tion.14 California was the only ex-

15 and its decision came
II ception
with the aid of a statute which

presumed a child conceived, but
not yet born, to be an existing person to the extent necessary for
protection of its interests in the
event of its subsequent birth.16
Frequently, lower courts in the
other cases cited above would allow recovery, only to be reversed
on appeal.17 A 1924 Pennsylvania
lower court allowed recovery, but
the decision was not appealed.18
The case appears to have been nullified by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's later decision in Berlin v.
J. C. Penney Co., lnc.19 Canada allowed a cause of action as early
as 1933;20 however, the decision
did not have an immediate impact
in the United States.
The Restatement of Torts followed the common law cases decided before its adoption in 1939,
and stated: "A person who negligently causes harm to an unborn
child is not liable to such child for
the harm.'"'
The turning point probably came
in 1946 in the federal court case
of Bonbrest v. Kotz, 22 where an
action by a viable child for a prenatal injury was sustained based
solely on the common law. However, the first American court of
final jurisdiction to allow a common law recovery for injuries incurred before birth was Williams
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., in
1949.23 Shortly afterward, Minnesota allowed the personal representative of a stillborn child to
bring an action for its wrongful
death since it was viable at the
time of the injury.24
As the principal case points out,
since 1949 seven states have overruled former decisions denying recovery, · and nine ·states dealing
with the question for the first time
have upheld recovery. These are
all cited in Sinkler v. Kneale together with the eight states that
deny recovery.25 Four of the latter
are described as strongly indicating that reversal is now likely, depending on viability and other
circumstances.
The Pennsylvania Court in the
Sinkler case was impressed by the
fact that the four jurisdictions on
which the Berlin case relied have
all reversed themselves and at
present uphold the right of action
when the child is born alive.26 Thus
with sufficient precedent for reversal and the current state of
medical knowledge behind it,
Pennsylvania became the most recent state to allow recovery for injuries sustained before birth.

N.J.L. i55, 26 A.2d 489 (194.2) ; :r,;'ew mMl v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60 , 274 ::-...,,.- .
710 (1937).
18. I0ne v. Zrlclce-rman, 4 Pa.D. & C.
t77 (1924).
1 9. l3erlln v. J . C. Penney Co., 339
l'a. 5-17 . l •A. 2d 2S ( 194-0) .
20 . Montreal Tramways v. Leveille,
4 D.L.R, 337 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1933) .
21 . ;Restatement, Torts §869 (19a9).
22. 66 F .SUPTJ. 138 CD.D ... 1948).
2S. 162 Ohio St. 11.1, 87 N.E. 2d 334

(1949) .
24. 'Verkennes v. Cornlea, 229 .:.\ilnn.
365 0 38 N.W.2d 83 C1949}.
2~. 401 Pa. 267, 269, 164 A. 2d 03,
95 (1960) .
26. Wood~ , •. Lane t. 303 N'.Y. 349,
102 N.E. 2.d 691 Cl9iil) ; • mann ,·.
Faidy 415 Ill. 4.22. iH N .E. 2d 41&
(1968); Smith v. 'Brennan, 31 N.J. 353 ,
157 A. 2d 497 (1960>. : and R e ves v.
Constr\Jctlon Senioe, Inc., 165 N'.El 2d
912 (Mass. 1960).
27. 4.01 Pa. 267, 270, 164 A. 2d 93,
96 (1960).
28.
Dietrich
v.
Inhabitants
of
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep.
242 (Sup. Ind. Ct. 1884).
29. See, e.g., Williams v. Marion
:R.a,p ld Tr-ansit, Inc., 11i2 OhlQ St. 11'1,
S7 N.E. 2r.I 33'1 (19-19), B011b.resc v.
;Kot;,;. t,5 F. Supp. 138 (D.U. , l 946).
SO. Dorland, l)lu stra ed Medical Dictionary p. 50 (23d ed. 1957}.
3 L Will Ill.ms ,·. l\[arion Rap.id Transit. Inc .. 152 OhJo St. 11-1. 'i ~.E. 2d
334 094~).
32. Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile
Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W. 2d
163 (1959).
33. Sinkler v. KneaJe, •IOI Pa. 267,

The position of the courts before
1946 is summarized in the dissenting opinion of Sinkler v. Kneale.21
Basically, the reasoning behind the
no cause of action rule originated
by Justice Holmes was that a child
en ventre sa mere was not a separate person, but was a part of the
mother. One could owe no duty to
a person not legally in existence
nor to one whose presence was not
readily foreseeable. Any injury to
the unborn child which was not too
remote to be recovered for at all
was recoverable by the mother.2s
As a practical matter the courts
considered the difficulty of proving
causal connection between the negligence and the injury. They feared
a multitude of fraudulent and fictitious claims would result if recovery were permitted. Furthermore,
it might cause increased litigation
and greater family discord because
the logical extension was to allow
the child to sue the mother and
anyone else who caused injuries,
directly or indirectly. Also, stare
decisis influenced some judges who
believed in the finality of the law
on which people should be able to
rely. To them this was a problem
for the legislatures not the courts.
Collectively these arguments were
difficult to overcome.
Recognition of a cause of action
in prenatal injury cases developed
step by step. The first cases allowing recovery emphasized the fact
that the child was viable at the
time of the injury.29 A viable child
is defined as a· fetus that has
reached such a stage of development that it can live outside of the
uterus independently of the mother.3o Usually this commences in
the sixth or seventh month, but it
may occur earlier. In the case of
viability it was possible to overcome the argument that the child
was not a separate entity. This was
dramatically illustrated in Williams
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., where
the mother died and the injured
viable child taken from her survived.31 It could not, therefore, be
argued that this child was not a
separate person at the time of the
injury.
Once the theoretical arguments
were overcome, it was not too difficult for the courts to set aside the
practical hindrances to recovery.
The problem of proof is not unique
to this area of tort law and does
not justify the denial of a remedy.
Advances in the field of medicine
have lessened the uncertainty in
proving causation. A strict application of the rules of evidence
should protect one from false and
fraudulent claims. This was amply
illustrated by a Wisconsin decision
very similar to the principal case.32
A child allegedly born Mongoloid
as the result of an auto accident
had been allowed to recover in the
lower court, but the case was reversed on appeal because the court
said there was not sufficient evidence of causation.
The answer to the argument that
increased litigation would result is
that if one has an actionable right,
a court should be available to grant
a remedy. Justice Bell's apprehension of greater family discord 33 is
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35. Reyes v. Construction Ser,1ce,
Rys. Co. of St. Lou.is, 24 Mo. l 26, 1;;4
Inc., 166 N.E. 2d 91.2 (ll~ss. 1960).
S .W. 71 (1913); Lipp~ , •. 1\Iilwaukee
30. Taylo r . Liab.t.ity for NegHg nt
~J1ectr~c R_y. and tJght Co., 16 4 Wis.
bci,w·v to p,.e u,~born, 36 D!cta 323,
212, loO ?-; .W . 916 (1916.); Drol,1rler v.
325 (11159).
P eters, 232 N.Y: 2-20, 133 N.E. 567
37. Ibid.
(1021) ; Stanford v. St. Loui s-San
38. ee, o..,,.., Comment, 5 St. Louis
Franc isco R~· .. lll4 • la. GU, 108 -o.
U.L.J. 151 (105S).
666 (1920); 'M agnolia Coca Cola Bot39. Yerkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn.
tll.Jlg Co. v. Jordan, 124 T ex. 34.7, 7S
365, 38 r'.W. 2d 838 (1949).
S.W. 2d 94'1 (193 5) ; .~ewman v . De40. 63 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (19-19} and
t roit, 2S1 ~[icll. 80 , 2N N.W. 710
34 l\linn. L. '.Rev. 66 (1949).
4L Wendt v. Lillo, l 2 F. S upp. 56,
<1937) : tern.mer "'· 'Kline, 12s ~'.J.L.
455,
20 A. 2d 4 9 (194.2) : B<rrlln v .
62 (N.D. Iowa 1960).
.
J. C. Penney C o., In c., 339 Pa. ci47,
42. Musohetti v . Charles Pflzer &
16 A. 2d 2S (]940).
Co .. 144 N.)'.".
l!d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
15. Scott ,·. i\:[cPheeters, 33 Cal. App.
Norman v. Murphy, 268 P.2d 178 (Cal.
3d 620_ 92 P . 2d 678 (1939).
272, 164 A.. 2d 9!1, 9 (1960) .
Ct. .App. 1964) .
16. cat. Ci,·. Code, § 29 (1941).
34. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
43. Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev.
17 . See, 6.!J., Stemmer v. Kline, 128 157 A . 2d 497 (19:60) .
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not a likely result. As a practical
matter a child does not usually
sue its parents.
Neither is stare decisis a bar to
recovery in those states which have
previously considered the question.
This principle applies mainly to decisions which invite reliance such
as in the fields of contract and
property law where people are
more likely to order their affairs
based on existing law. One who is
negligent has no right to argue
that he acted in reliance on a rule
barring recovery for prenatal injuries. "The law of negligence is
primarily common law, whose great
virtue is its adaptability to the
conditions and needs of changing
times." 34 As stated by Justice Williams in reversing Justice Holmes:
"Although [the] doctrine [of
stare decisis] is salutary it may be
more important in a given case
that the court be right, in the light
of later examination of authorities,
wider and more thorough discussion and reflection upon the policy
of the law, than that it adhere to
previous decisions." 35
It was an inevitable result that
recovery would be extended to the
nonviable fetus once the viable
theory had become sufficiently
entrenched. There was no justifiable distinction between the two as
far as the injured child was concerned. He had a right to enter
the world with a sound body regardless of when the injury occurred.

Any denial of recovery because
of nonviability is arbitrary and unfair. Medical science recognizes
that the embryo becomes a separate being from the time of conception. This view is found in
current oaths of doctors. The pertinent sentence in the Geneva ver·
sion of the Hippocratic Oath as
adopted by the World Medical Association compnsmg thirty-nine
national medical societies including the American Medical Association reads, "I will maintain the
utmost respect for human life from
the time of its conception." 36 The
International Code of Medical Ethics in defining a doctor's duty
states, "A doctor must always be.a r
in mind the importance of preserving human life from tlie time of
conception until death.'' 37

Rights Upheld
The law with respect to property,
inheritance and criminal law recognizes one's rights from the time
of conception. Those who argue
for eliminating the viability distinction say it is illogical not to
afford the same protection to unborn children in the field of tort
law.as
Perhaps the distinction between
viable and nonviable fetuses is
more an illusion in the eyes of
judges and writers on the subject
than it is real. Judges who write
the decisions emphasize they are
allowing recovery because the child
was viable 39 and note writers criticize them for being too narrowminded.40 Yet no jurisdiction which
has allowed recovery to a viable
fetus who survived has later denied
recovery to a child who survived
an injury suffered before it was
viable. If the language of the cases
limiting recovery to the viable
(Continued On Page 6)

44. Terkennes v. Cornieal Z29 Minn.
365, 38 N.W. 2d 838 (194-9 J .
45. Wend v. Lillo, .1S2 F. Supp. 56,
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The knotty: problem of determining the extent to which state police
power 1 is curtailed by the federal
constitution• in matters affecting
interstate carriers is the subject
of numerous Supreme Court decisions, the latest of which is Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.3 This case involved the con-

stitutionality of the Detroit Smoke
Abatement Code4 as applied to
ships federally licensed to operate
in interstate commerce on the
Great Lakes.
The ships were owned and
operated by the Cement Co. for the
purpose of transporting cement
produced at its mill in Michigan to
ports in the various states bordering on the Great Lakes. While two
of these ships were docked at De·
troit, it was found necessary to
keep their boilers fired so that
deck machinery could be operated.
This required periodic cleaning of
the fires causing the emission of
smoke which exceeded the maximum allowable under the ordinance.
In the state circuit court, the
Cement Co. sought to enjoin criminal proceedings for a violation of
the ordinance instituted against it
in the Detroit Recorder's Court.
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed 5 the circuit court's refusal
to grant relief, and as a result an
appeal was carried to the United
States Supreme Court.
Speaking for the majority, Mr.
Justice Stewart upheld the decision
of the Michigan court and declared
that the ordinance is a valid local
regulation. In rejecting the Cement
Co.'s contention that the federal inspecting and licensing legislation 6
was preemptive and that the city
ordinance, "materially affects interstate commerce in matters where
uniformity is necessary," he said
that the ordinance is an "evenhanded" exercise of the state's
police power in promoting the
health and welfare of the city's
residents and was neither discriminatory nor unduly burdensome on
interstate commerce. It was further
stated that the ordinance, fairly
interpreted, is not in conflict with
the federal statute which indicates
a congressional intent to occupy
only a limited field. The majority
also felt that the local regulation
in this case was not lacking in uniformity, because there was no
showing that other conflicting regulations actually existed.
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the
dissenting opinion in which Mr.
Justice Frankfurter concurred. He
pointed out that the ordinance provided for the sealing of shirs which
failed to meet the standards established by it even though the same
equipment had been federally li-

1. U.S. CONST. amend. X, "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the Sta.tes. are reserved to the
States res pectively, or to the people."
With respec.t ,to Inter~! :u comm,erce, the
states may 'in some Instances constitutionally pass laws to protect the safety,
health, and welfare of their citizens
under thrs amendment. Wilson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
245 ( 1829) is an early example.

2. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, "The
Congress shall have Power . . . To
regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States
and with the Indian Tribes ; . . ."
'
3. 362 : U .S. 440 (1960).
4. Detroit, Mich., Ordinance No. 167
-E.
5. 355 Mich. 227, 93 N.W. 2d 888
(1959).
6. REv. STAT. Secs. 417-19 (1875), as

censed to operate in interstate commerce. 7 He felt that this provision,
combined with that providing for
criminal prosecution of the ship
owners, obstructed the free use of
a license granted under an act of
Congress and consequently should
be struck down as unconstitutional.
The dissenting opinion concluded
by saying that the question of uniformity of regulation does not
depend upon the existence of contrary regulations in other localities,
but rather upon the subject matter,
which in this case does not admit
of varying local controls.
The Court's approach to present
day controversies involving local
regulations of interstate commerce
is based upon a foundation of its
earlier leading decisions. The first
of these was Gibbons v. Ogden.s
In his now famous opinion, Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall withdrew
the meaning of "commerce," as
used in the constitutional grant to
Congress, from the depths of
ambiguity. He reasoned that commerce encompasses activity involving traffic and commercial
intercourse, including the instrumentalities and agencies which
give it life. Marshall said that federal power to regulate commerce
need not stop at fhe boundary line
of a state, but may be introduced
into its interior if it also affects
activity in other states.9
About five years later, when
faced with an attempt by a state to
regulate navigable waters, Marshall
held, with a majority of the Court,
that where a state is properly exercising its police power to protect
the health and welfare of its residents, and where there is no conflict with federal legislation, there
is no reason to view the commerce
clause as being violated.IO

Cooley Case
In another leading case, decided
in 1851, Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia,11 the Court
was asked to determine the validity
of a Pennsylvania statute requiring
the use of pilots on ships entering
and leaving Philadelphia's harbor,
there being at the same time an
act of Congress specifically delegating control of pilotage to the
states. In his majority opinion, Mr.
Justice Curtis said that the mere
grant to Congress of the power to
regulate commerce did not deprive
the states of all their legislative
prerogative in this field. He pointed
out that many aspects of interstate
commerce do not require the exclusive regulation of Congress, but
on the contrary, may be best
served by state regulation. The
basis of this decision was the
Court's realization that the state

amended.
46
U.S.C.
secs.
390-93
(1958).
7. 362 U.S. at 450-51.
8. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
There it was held that a New York
legislative license to Ogden violated
the commerce clause in granting him
exclusive rights to operate steamboats
between New York City and various
places in New Jersey; Gibbons held
a federal license to operate between
the same places.
9. Id. at 197.
10. Wilson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) H5 (1829) .
A D el&ware statu te a u t.hori:i:ing the
construction of a dam. acroets a navigable stream was sustained as a means
of enhancing the adjacent land values
and of providing a more healthful environment for the residents of the
area. By way of dictum, Marshall said
that had Congress occupied the field
the Court would not hesitate to hold
the Delaware act void.
11. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).

regulation dealt with a subject of of equipment to be used on locoa local character not requiring na- motives, but the Commission had
tional uniformity.
never issued regulations pertaining
to these particular items. In strikIn the Huron case, one of the ing down the state ·laws involved,
cases cited as supporting the ma- the Court said, through Mr. Justice
jority was Kelly v. Washington.12 Brandeis, that the federal act preThis case, decided in 1937, ap- cluded state legislation because it
proved a Washington statute re- was intended to occupy the whole
quiring the inspection of the hull field, and the fact that the Comand machinery of tug boats operat- m1Ss1on had not exercised its
ing in interstate commerce along powers to specify the type of
the Pacific Coast, its purpose being equipment to be used made no difto insure safety and to determine ference.19
seaworthiness. Since the federal
In comparing Huron to Napier,
ships 13 do not apply to tug boats,
laws relating to the inspection of Mr. Justice Douglas thought that a
the Court found no conflict. It was close analogy could be drawn.
held that a vessel which is actually Neither dealt with an inspection
unsafe is not a subject protected statute as did the Kelly case. Both
by the principle requiring uni- involved a federal agency which
formity of regulation. Mr. Chief could promulgate rules as to the
Justice Hughes stated that there is type of equipment required, the
nothing in the Constitution requir- Interstate Commerce Commission
ing Congress to enact legislation in Napier and the Coast Guard in
which would occupy the whole field Huron. Notice, however, that the
of the subject matter being regu- local legislation in Napier required
lated. On the contrary, Congress the installation of special equipmay regulate only a limited field, ment as did the Bibb case, while
and when it does so, state regula- in Huron it did not. Is this not sigtion outside its coverage is not for nificant from the standpoint of the
bidden or displaced, if otherwise burden cast upon interstate comadmissible. He emphasized that a merce?
proper exercise of the state's police
A case which has greater s1mi·
power is superseded only where larity to Huron in its reasoning is
the conflict with existing federal South Carolina State Highway
legislation is so direct and positive Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., lnc.20 In
that the two acts cannot be recon- upholding the validity of a South
ciled.14 In conclusion, however, he Carolina statute restricting the
said that if the state attempted to weight and width of motor vehicles
impose standards relating to struc- using its highways, the Court said
ture, design, equipment or opera- that although the commerce clause
tion which go beyond what is has been held of its own force to
essential to safety, it would have curtail state power to regulate inencountered the principle that such terstate commerce in some measrequirements must be established ure, it did not forestall all state
through the action of Congress in action affecting commerce. There
declaring a uniform rule.15
are matters of local concern, the
regulation
of which affects interThe fact that the Detroit ordinance in Huron did not require state commerce but which, because
structural alterations to the ships of their local character and their
is significant, because if it had, the number and diversity, may never
Court need only turn to a case it be acted upon by Congress. Notdecided in 1959 for a recent prece- withstanding the commerce clause,
dent pointing the way. Bibb v. the Court held that regulations of
Navajo Freight Lines, lnc.16 There, the type involved in this case
an Illinois statute requiring the use should be left to the states in the
of contour mudguards on trucks absence of congressional action.
was declared invalid, because its
In contrasting the Bibb and
effect was to make illegal in Illi- South Carolina Highway cases, if
nois the use of conventional mud- one looks to the changing circumguards allowed in almost all the stances of interstate highway transother states and required in Arkan- portation between 1938, the year of
sas. Since the necessity of welding the South Carolina Highway decicontour mudguards to trucks com- sion, and 1959, the year of the Bibb
ing from Arkansas would make decision, at least part of the underrapid changeover impossible, and lying reason for the Court's seeming
since there was evidence that this change in attitude becomes aptype of mudguard did nothing to parent. Since the trucking industry
promote safety, Mr. Justice Doug- has emerged over the years as a
las, with whom seven members of means of carriage comparable with
the Court joined, felt that the Illi- the railroads in national impornois law violated the commerce tance, it appears that the former
clause, because the diffculity of hesitancy of the Court to disturb
compliance and the conflict with the states' police powers in reguthe preexisting Arkansas statute lating the use of their highways
would impose serious burdens on has become somewhat dispelled in
interstate truckers. Although Ar- the balancing of local and national
kansas required conventional mud- interests. Interference by the states
guards, in so doing, it nevertheless has a more substantial effect on
conformed to a uniform practice interstate highway transportation
throughout the nation.
now than twenty-five years ago. In
The dissenting justice in Huron 1954, this changed attitude began
leaned heavily on Napier v. Atlan- to take shape when the Court held
tic Coast Line Railroad Co.17 as that the exclusion of an interstate
authority for their contention that trucking firm from the highways of
there was a collision of local and Illinois conflicted with the intent
federal law. In the Napier case one of Congress as expressed in the
state required the installation of Motor Carrier Act,21 even though
automatic fire doors on locomotives the purpose of the state statute
pulling interstate trains and an- was to punish the firm for violating
other state required the use of cab Illinois highway regulations.22 Percurtains during the winter time. haps it would be proper to conThe Boiler Inspection Act 1s gave clude that in these later highway
the Interstate Commerce Commis- cases, the Court is placing greater
sion authority to specify the kinds emphasis on the extent to which
0

12. 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
13. 36 Stat. 462 (1910) .
14. 302 U.S. at 10.
15. Id. at 15.
16. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
17. 272 U.S. 605 (1926) .

interstate commerce is burdened
and the susceptibility of the problem to congressional control. There
seems to be an increasing concern
with the difficulty interstate highway carriers have in conforming to
the challenged state regulations. It
is doubtful that the Court today
would reason as it did in Sporles v.
Binford,23 where it said that when
the subject of the regulation lies
within the police power of the
state, ". . . debatable questions as
to reasonableness are not for the
courts but for the legislature,
. . . and its action within its range
of discretion cannot be set aside
because compliance is burdensome... .'' 24
The earlier cases apparently
based their decisions more on
whether or not interstate commerce
was discriminated against than on
principles of uniformity or the extent to which it was burdened.25
If confronted with these same cases
today it is questionable whether
the Court would be so inclined to
uphold these state laws if it felt
that they were really an unreasonable burden and set up standards
which did not conform with those
existing in the rest of the nation.
This theory is substantiated by
Morgan v. Virginia 26 where the
Court held invalid a Virginia statute requiring the segregation of
white and colored passengers on
interstate as well as intrastate carriers. All but one of the justices
took the position that the state
legislation violates the commerce
clause when it unduly burdens interstate commerce in matters
where uniformity is necessary. The
Court recognized that the uniformity principle lacked precision and
said that in its application it
should be viewed in the light of the
particular facts involved in each
case.

Review
In reviewing the cases within
the scope of this comment, one
soon finds that when Congress has
remained inactive, the Court is
placed in the position of having to
arbitrate the competing demands
of state and national interests.
While attempts have been made
from time to time to work with
mechanistic formulae and thus
avoid judging,21 they have ended
in failure. The trend of the Court's
recent thinking is well exemplified
by Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.2s An Arizona statute made it
unlawful to operate a train of
more than fourteen passenger or
seventy freight cars. In 1941, the
state sought to recover statutory
penalties for violations of the statute, and the state supreme court
upheld the act as a valid safety
measure designed to reduce the
number of accidents. Speaking
through Mr. Chief Justice Stone,
the Court reversed the state court
and outlined various steps to facilitate the formation of a sound basis
upon which judgment could be
entered. First, any asserted violation of the commerce clause must
be supported by relevant factual
information which will afford a
firm footing for an enlightened

(Continued On Page
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23. 286 U . S. 374 (1932) .
24. Id. at 388-89.
2~. An exam.J)le of this philosophy i.s
Moms v. Durby, 27~ U.S. 135 (192-G),
w here it wai. safd , "In the absence of
national legisl ation e5pec.ially cov ering
the subject of lnterstat~ commerce, th
S LnLe ma1· r ightly prescribe uniform
regula.tlons adopted to promote safety
upon its .hlghway and the <ions rvat:!on
18. 43 Stat. 659 (1924), 35 U.S.C. of
theb- ul;e, appllca.b le alike t o -vehiSec. 23 (1958).
cles moving in interstate commerce
and those of its own citizens."
19. 272 U.S. at 613.
26. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
20. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
27. E.g., original package doctrine
21. 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C.
of Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Secs. 301-27 (1958) .
22. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Wheat.) 419 (1827).
28. 325 U .S. 761 (1945).
Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
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NewFacultyMembers
William Mitchell has six new
faculty members this year who
bring to the school a variety of
backgrounds in education and experience.
Jeanette J. Bluhm was born
in Bertha, Minnesota. She graduated magna cum laude from Hamline University receiving her B.A.
degree and received an M.A. degree
from the University of Minnesota.
She th en att ended Yale
University Law
School and graduated with a "B"
average. Miss
Bluhm practiced
law for 12 years
in New York
City with the
firm of Winthrop, Stimson,
J. J. Bluhm
Putnam & Roberts. She then attented Columbia
University Law School, received
her LL.M. with an A- average. She
also attended the Parker School of
Foreign & Comparative Law at
Columbia University. She taught
high school English in Connecticut, and has served with the Civil
Aeronautics Board in Washington.
She is teaching Introduction to
Law this semester and will teach
Conflict of Laws next semester.
Charles Gordon is teaching
Administrative Law this year. Mr.
Gordon is the Regional Counsel in
an area of 16 states for the Immigration and Naturalization Service
of the U.S. Department of Justice.
He graduated from New York University Law School and attended
City College of New York. He is

practiced law in Brussels for
twenty-five years. For the last ten
years he has lived in St. Paul,
where he is International Operations Consultant to the General
Counsel of Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company. Last winter he lectured in the Institute on
Investments and Business Abroad
given at William Mitchell. He will
teach a course in Comparative Law
during the second semester which
will cover the great legal systems
of the world and their judicial organizations. The principles of contracts, torts, negligence and sales
under the various systems will be
compared.
David L. White is now teach
Labor Law. Mr. White is engaged
in general practice with the firm of
Faricy, Moore, Costello and Hart.
He received his undergraduate de-

D. L. White
Van der Borght
gree magna cum laude from Ohio
University where he was president
of the student body and Phi Beta
Kappa. He was graduated from Harvard Law School.
Paul G. Zerby is associated
with Mr. Robert J. Johnson in
teaching Income Taxation. Mr.
Zerby attended the University of
Minnesota, where he received his
B.A. in Economics and was graduated from Harvard Law School,
after which he clerked for Chief
Justice Peter Woodbury of the
First Circuit Court of Appeals. Last
year he was one of the lecturers at
William Mitchell's Institute on Investments and Business Abroad.
Mr. Zerby practices law with the
firm of Dorsey, Owen, Barber, Marquart and Windhorst.
Hon. Douglas K. Amdahl will reco-author of the outstanding work turn to William Mitchell as an
on immigration, "Immigration Law active faculty member in the secand Procedure" by Gordon and
Rosenfield. He is the author of an
article in the current issue of the
Minnesota Law Review on "Right
to Counsel In Immigration Proceedings."
Roger W. Schnobrich is sharing with Mr. William J. Erickson
the course in Legal Accounting.
Mr. Schnobrich graduated in 1952
from the University of Minnesota,
where he received his B.B.S., and
D. K. Amdahl
P. G. Zerby
in 1954 from the University of ond semester. Judge Amdahl, who
Minnesota Law School. He is a is an alumnus of our school of the
member of the Order of the Coif class of '51, taught here for several
and is a partner in the law firm of years, but found himself too busy
Erickson, Popham, Haik and Schno- to continue two years ago. He was
brich.
given a leave of absence on his
Dr. Raymond B. Van der Borght promise to resume his teaching
was born in Belgium and received duties in the near future. He is
the degrees of Doctor of Philoso- keeping his promise and will inphy and Doctor of Jurisprudence struct the course in Business Assofrom the University of Louvain. He ciations in the next semester.

,

Professional Responsibility
Course Expands Schedule
By Kenneth Mitchell

Students entering their fourth
and, hopefully, final year at William Mitchell are finding a reorganized two credit course on Professional Responsibility added to
the curriculum.
The course implements the canons of legal ethics originally formulated by the American Bar Association and now familiar to every
lawyer. While the original pronouncements served for many
years, the extension of a lawyer's
activities and duties led to several
supplemental studies, with broader
and more definitive reports.
The impelling purpose of the
course is to bring to the attention
of students, before they become
lawyers, some of the situations
they will encounter in their professional practice which involve
problems of professional conduct.
This course seeks to make the students aware that there are hazards
in the practice of law and they
must be alert to watch for these
hazards and avoid stumbling into
them. If there is any novelty in
William Mitchell's approach to this
troublesome area of legal education, about which the law schools,
lawyers, and the courts have been
concerned for many years, it is the
comprehensiveness with which this
covers so many types of situations
in practice and so many problems
of professional responsibility.
The course might almost be
called a practical demonstration on
how to build a reputation and keep
it. Nor is reputation always a grandoise idea. It is sometimes founded
on a series of little impressions
that build respect, as evidenced by
Mr. William H. Oppenheimer's
series or practice tidbits under the
title of "Law Office Management".
This seemingly colorless topic became meaningful with the revelation of this speaker's high sense
of duty to his clients and the
meticulous care with which he protects his own reputation as a
lawyer.
If the course benefits the individual students, it also benefits the
profession as a whole. It takes only
a passing familiarity with the headlines of some of the major newspapers to learn of members of the
bar who are charged with violating their professional responsibilities. Whether the charges are
proven or not is immaterial to this
subject; the fact is that a · lawyer's
transgressions are page one news,
which can and does affect the public's trust and the lawyer's income.

Last year's experience resulted
in some strengthening of the
course for the current year. The
discussion of special problems in
divorce practice was expanded by
adding to Judge Theodore B. Knudson's exposition of the Family
Court of Hennepin County a talk

Chairman Reports On Placement At William Mitchell
Once a person has "placed" himself in the legal profession, there
inevitably comes a day when he
must "place" himself in a job. It
is on that day that the neophite
lawyer should be aware of the
numerous opportunities in the field
of law, a field which ranges from
adoption to zoning.
A question is often asked,
"Shouldn't any law student worth
his salt be able to get his own
job?" The answer is that the competent law student in the vast majority of cases does procure employment within a relatively short
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By Edward Soshnik, Chairman
time after completion of school.
But in too many cases it is only
a job, sometimes taken because
of economic necessity, and once
the novelty of the new adventure
has passed, the young lawyer realizes that he has made a mistake.
To avoid such a mistake, the law
student should learn and be aware
of the advantages and disadvantages of choosing a law firm as a
career, of practicing corporation
law, of using his legal knowledge
with a business enterprise,
The Placement Bureau at William Mitchell College of Law is

now in its fourth year of operation,
and, while it is still in the formative stages, it has already proved
to be of assistance to students and
graduates. Many of the students
are presently working and putting
themselves through school in positions obtained through the Placement Bureau.
At present, it must be said that
the Placement Bureau has not yet
reached the level of the model
placement
program
previously
mentioned, but the program is
young and eager and indications
are that it will soon take a back
seat to none in the placement field .

Schedule
Candor and
Fairness ... . Frank J. Hammond
Special Problems in Criminal
Practice ... Judge John W. Graff
The Lawyer as a Fiduciary ... . Judge Oscar R. Knutson

by Mr. Richard E. Kyle on the
problems encountered in actual
divorce trials. More time has been
allotted for the lectures on problems in probate practice by Mr.
David R. Brink, the relations between lawyers and physicians by
Mr. Charles R. Murnane, and relations between lawyers and real estate and insurance men by Mr.
Fred A. Kueppers, Sr.
A new speaker, Mr. Erwin Mitch
Goldstein, will discuss relations of
lawyers with accountants, and the
problems a lawyer in general practice has when dealing with a lawyer who is a specialist in a limited
field.
At the end of last year's course
the members of the class were
asked to write their comments and
suggestions for the improvement
of the course. A few came up with
the idea that, while it is all right
for "these $50,000 per year speakers" to tell us how they act in certain situations, how about having
a young lawyer who is not yet
making that kind of money tell us
what he does in some of those
forbidding situations? The Committee on Professional Responsibility
liked the idea and selected as the
speaker, although with some trepidation that it might not be meeting the financial stipulations of the
suggestion, Mr. William J. Erickson, who will address the last session of the course on the subject,
"Problems of Professional Responsibility as Viewed by the Young
Lawyer".

Special Problems in Probate
Practice ........ David R. Brink
Problems in Family Law
Judge Theodore B. Knudson
Special Problems in Divorce
Practice .... . . Richard E. Kyle
Advertising and Solicitation . ......... Robert F. Henson
The Lawyer and His Profession . . . ... .. .. .. Philip Neville
Law Office Management. . William H. Oppenteimer
Relations Between Lawyers and
Physicians . . Charles R. Murnane
Corporate
Counsel. .. , Fordyce W. Crouch
Relations Between Lawyers and
Real Estate and Insurance
Men ... . . Fred A. Kueppers, Sr.
Relations Between Lawyers and
Accountants . . . . . . Erwin Mitch
Goldstein
The General Practioners' Problems
In Dealing with Lawyer Specialists . . .
. .. .. . Mr. Goldstein
Special Problems in Trial
Tactics ......... Philip Stringer
Special Problems in Tax Practice ..... . . .. . Hayner N. Larson
Problems of Professional Responsibility as Viewed by the Young
Lawyer . ... William J. Erickson

(Continued From Page 4)
judgment. Second, the mere legislative recital that the statute is a
safety measure does not bind the
Court; it must analyze the effect of
the statute and make a determination for itself. Third, even if the
Court deems it a safety measure, it
must look at the total result and
decide whether it is outweighed by
the national interest to keep interstate commerce free from nonuniform local interferences.
Notwithstanding the Court's expressed desire in the Southern
Pacific case to judge each fact situation on an individual basis, it has
subsequently tended to look at the
matter with an eye to tradition.29
If the matter is one about which
Congress has historically legislated,
such as railroads as opposed to
highways, the Court is more likely
to hold that existing federal legislation precludes state regulation.
Of course, the apparent scope of
the federal act is an important factor. The more it appears to be a
complete system of regulation, the
more likely it is that the state law
will be declared superseded.
Eminent students of constitutional law ao have found it difficult to
reconcile the Court's reasoning in
the Huron and Southern Pacific
cases. In Southern Pacific, Mr.
Chief Justice Stone said that if one
state could regulate train lengths,
so could all the others. The result
would be that interstate railroads
would have to conform to, "a crazy
quilt of State laws." s1 It was his
opinion that where national uniformity is necessary, no regulation
at all is preferable to the confusion and difficulty which would
arise from a burdensome patchwork of state legislation. It was the
possibility, not the actuality, of "a
crazy quilt" which led the Court to
invalidate the Arizona statute.
The apparent inconsistency between Huron and Southern Pacific
may in part be reconciled by comparing the modes of transportation
involved in each case. In distinguishing the South Carolina Highway decision from Southern Pacific,

Mr. Chief Justice Stone noted that
the cases involving state limitations
on motor vehicle size and weight
have an added element not present
in the railroad cases. That element
is the use of highways furnished
and maintained by the state.s2 This
appears to be sufficient to tip the
scales in favor of state regulatory
power. The attitude of the Court
could well be that more extensive
state control is permissible where
the regulation has a direct relation
to the cost of maintaining state
owned transportation facilities as
well as to the safety of the public.
It is quite possible tl;tat the same
approach was adopted by ri1r. Justice Stewart in analyzing the .effects
of the Detroit Smoke Abatement
Code on ships using the ''city's. harbor, a situation similar to that of
the harbor pilots in . the C~oley
case. The health of th.e. !!ity'.s : residents is a subject peculiarly of
local concern, and, as .all obJectl.~e
of local regulation, it appe~rS:: to
outweigh national uniformity more
than other measures .. with.: less
laudable judicially defined purposes.
·
As indicated above, the p\.irpose
of the state regulation, as construed by the Court is of prime
importance in'. determining · its
validity. Wh~re the promotion of
safety, for example, was a mere
incident of denying an iiiterstate
carrier the right to operate in a
manner most advantageous to it,
the real purpose being to prevent
competition, the Court found little
difficulty in holding such state action unconstitutional. Buck v. Kuykendalf.33 On the other hand, in
Bradley v. Pub. Util. Comm'sn. of
Ohio,34 the Court upheld an order
denying an interstate carrier a
certificate to operate over a congested state highway on the ground
that it would be an undue hazard
to the safety of the motoring public. In distinguishing the Buck case,
the Court noted that the test employed there was the adequacy of
existing transportation facilities,
whereas in the Bradley case the
(Continued On Page 6)

Justice for the Poor .... . Professor
Maynrad E. Pirsig, U. of Minn.
Law School
Conflicting Interests . .. ..... .... John G. Dorsey
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Judge Pearson Long Active
As Trustee and Teacher
The Honorable Albin S. Pearson
was born on January 27, 1894 at
Amery, Wisconsin, and is a graduate of the academic and law departments of the University of Minnesota.
Judge Pearson's classmates at the
University of Minnesota Law School
included Stafford King, state auditor, and John Dulebohn, professor
at tl:e William Mitchell College of
Law and formerly General Counsel
of the Twin City Rapid Transit
Company.
After receiving his LL.B. degree
in 1916, Judge Pearson engaged in
general practice. He served as a
field artillery officer in World War
I, and in 1920 became the first district commander of the Ramsey
County American Legion.
Judge Pearson was elected to the
Minnesota Legislature in 1923, reelected in 1925, when he became
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and was a member of
the 1926 State Crime Commission.
In 1930, he was appointed Ramsey
County Probate Judge .
In 1931, he and five other Minnesota attorneys undertook the revision of the Minnesota Probate
Code. This code, somewl:at revised
in 1889, had remained virtually unchanged since it was originally enacted by the Minnesota Legislature
in 1858. A careful study of the
existing probate code and judicial

decisions subsequent to 1849 was
made. In 1934, the 200 sections of
the proposed probate code were
finished. After receiving the endorsement of the Minnesota State
Bar Association, the new code was
presented to the Minnesota Legislature and was enacted into law in
1935. It remains unchanged except
for a few minor corrections made
in 1939.
Appointed Ramsey County District Judge in 1939 after nine years
in the Probate Court, Judge Pearson has served in this position for
over 22 years. In addition to tis
judicial duties, he served as an instructor in probate law at the St.
Paul College of Law, and later at
the William Mitchell College of
Law. In 1960, he retired from the
faculty after teaching probate law
for 25 years.
The judge was a trustee of the
former St. Paul College of Law
from 1939 to 1956 and he is presently a member of the Board of
Trustees and Treasurer of the William Mitchell College of Law.
Judge Pearson recently attended
the 50th reunion of his l:igh school
graduating class and the 45th reunion of his law school graduating
class. He has been a member of the
St. Paul Athletic Club for over 40
years and is presently serving as
Vice President. Judge Pearson is
married and has two sons and one
daughter.

Prenatal Injuries (Continued From Page 3)
child be regarded as dicta, as it arate entities in the biological
should, then the question remains sense only.43 They become legal
open in most jurisdictions as to the persons at birth and only then
does the potential liability become
fate of the nonviable child.
complete. If they die before birth
The Sinkler case dismisses the
there would be no liability because
viability issue by concluding that
there would have been no damage
it has little to do with the basic
to a legal person. Under this view
right to recover and that the questhere is a wrong for which there
tion is primarily one of causation.
would be no remedy. Would it be
Recovery under wrongful death
fair to allow a child who lived one
statutes involves basically the same
hour to recover while the personal
problems. In the words of Judge
representative of the child who
Graven:
was born dead received nothing?
"The division of the courts This position probably results in
doesn't turn on whether the infant an unnecessary distinction although
did or did not live following birth, it does avoid the causation problem
but on the broader question of in miscarriages. Under the rewhether recovery should be per- covery rule all miscarriages result
mitted at all for prenatal injuries in a potential liability in someone.
to a viable child. The writers and
Sinkler v. Kneale does not inannotators in this field generally
volve a wrongful death statute, but
treat the cases permitting recovery
the decision is probably broad
for prenatal injury to a viable
enough to allow recovery in such
child in any situation as constituta situation.
ing one line of authority and those
The principal case together with
not in accord as constituting the
Smith v. Brennan present as thorother." u
ough an examination of a subject
This conclusion follows from the
as can be found in the cases on
purpose of the wrongful death statany subject. Sinkler does not add
utes which was to give the deanything particularly new to the
cedent's representative the cause
field of prenatal injuries, but it
of action the deceased person could
does reaffirm and add weight to
have maintained had he lived.
the growing line of authorities alHowever, at least two states which
lowing recovery.
allow recovery for prenatal injuries when the child is born alive
In considering local law on the
deny the cause of action when the subject of prenatal injuries it
child is born dead.42 One writer must be recognized that Minnesota
supports their view with the argu- was the first jurisdiction to allow
ment that unborn infants are sep- recovery for the wrongful death
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taugl:t me that the lawyers who
drive air-conditioned automobiles,
play golf whenever the notion
strikes them and live to sun-ripened
old age, are those who can make
correct decisions, reach the right
answers to problems. This ability
is the pay-dirt in the practice.
Question Six: As I come to the
bar from a good law school, am I
prepared to practice? Answer:
Probably not. Ours is the least
proficient of all professions, I
think, in craftsmanship. We come
to tl:e bar pretty familiar with
what certain selected courts have
held in disputed and obscure matters in which we probably will have
no actual concern at any time. We
have learned what meaning harassed and perplexed judges have
by force of necessity given to language wholly without meaning, and
how the courts have rescued deserving litigants out of the messes
into wtich the errors of counsel
have plunged them. In short, we
are thoroughly conversant with the
case books. But we are probably
devoid of the tools of the practice,
such as writing, speaking, investigating facts or alleged facts, divining law in circumstances, the gentle
arts of persuasion, the available
protections against the pressures
of controversy.
Question Seven: Why be a lawyer? Answer: The best reason is
the joy brougtt by the daily struggle with human problems, the sense
of achievement, and of service. If
you just want to make money, you
better go into business.
Question Eight: How should a
lawyer fix his fees? Answer: I
don't know, and I don't think anybody else does.
(Prenatal Injuries)
of the child before birth. 44 In Verkennes v. Corniea an action was
brought against the physician for
injuries to a viable child during
delivery which resulted in death.
In allowing recovery the court emphasized the fact that the child was
a viable person. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has never decided
a case involving a nonviable child,
but in the light of additional precedent and expanding medical
knowledge it would probably agree
with the Sinkler case today.
Remaining for future cases to
decide is the effect of contributory
negligence by the mother on the
right of the child to recover. To
date this problem has not been
considered. Perhaps it can be resolved in the same manner as
passenger claims in auto accidents.
Just as the contributory negligence
of the driver does not prevent his
passenger from recovering from the
other driver, the child should not
be precluded from bringing suit
against the other party because the
mother was also negligent. This
may result in third party claims
against the mother, but that does
not directly concern the injured
party.
Another problem, not serious
yet, is the effect of fallout from
atomic tests on unborn babies. To
what extent this will cause developmental defects and result in tort
claims cannot be predicted.
In conclusion it can be said that
the development of the law of prenatal injuries truly portrays the
flexibility of the common law without the aid of statute. Here one
finds the law proceeding with caution, yet keeping pace with changing and expanding medical knowledge. As was stated by Judge
Graven:
"Seldom in the law has there
been such an overwhelming trend
in such a relatively short period of
time as there has been in the trend
toward allowing recovery for prenatal injuries to a viable infant." 45

Alumni Briefs
The Opinion is pleased to acknowledge receipt from Chief
Justice James T. Harrison of the
Supreme Court of Montana, LL.B.
1916, current news regarding some
alumni in Montana.
Associate Justice Albert H.
Angstman, LL.B. 1912, has retired
from the Montana Supreme Court
on April 9, 1961 having served as
an Associate Justice for some 28
years, which is the longest period
of service in the history of the
Montana Supreme Court.
District Judge Clifford E. Holt,
LL.B. 1912, retired from the District Court Bench in 1960 after
completing 24 years of service as a
District Judge.

John A. Burns, 79, retired Dean
of William Mitchell College of
Law, passed away September 11,
1961.

Dean Burns received his elementary and high school education
at Columbus, Wisconsin. He received his LL.B. Degree from the
St. Paul College of Law in 1904
and in 1905 received his LL.M. Degree from tl:e University of Minnesota Law School.
While attending the St. Paul
College of Law
he was instructor at · the West
St. Paul High
School, and superintendent of
sch o o 1 s. Mr.
Burns practiced
law as City Attorney of West
St. Paul. He was Assistant Corporation Counsel of the City of St.
Paul for nine years.
Dean Burns became a member
of the St. Paul College of Law
faculty in 1920 and was made
Trustee in 1939 and appointed Secretary to the Corporation in 1945
and Vice President in 1949. He
was appointed Dean in 1952 and
remained in that capacity until his
retirement in 1958.
·
He was a past President of the
Ramsey County Bar Association
and of tl:e Minnesota State Bar
Association, and was a member of
the American Bar Association.

Raymond J. Quinlivan, who graduated from the St. Paul College of
Law in 1922, died at his home in
St. Cloud, Minnesota, on October 12. Mr.
Quinlivan, who
was born in 1894
and was a graduate of Carleton
College, practiced law in St.
Cloud from the
time of his admission to the
bar in 1922. He was City Attorney
of St. Cloud for eight years.
Mr. Quinlivan was well known
throughout the state. He was a
member of the Board of Regents
of the University of Minnesota
from 1935 until his deatt., and was
Chairman of the Board for eleven
Rolf E. Dokmo, president of Buryears. As an alumnus he took an dett-Smith company and a graduate
active interest in the affairs of the of the St. Paul College of Law in
William Mitchell College of Law. 1927, has passed away.
Mr. Dokmo, in
State Police Power
affiliation with
(Continued From Page 5)
West Publishing
denial was to promote safety, and
Company, was a
the test was the congestion of the
consistant and
highway.
generous conIn conclusion, it may be said that
tributor to Wilunder certain conditions, local govli am Mitchell
ernments may regulate interstate
along with other
carriers under the police powers
executives of
reserved to the states and still be
the company.
in conformity with the commerce
The affairs of
clause of the federal constitution. Burdett-Smith Company are being
The standards for testing the valid- caried on by James A. Rafftery,
ity of such local control may be vice president and a 1951 graduate
briefly stated as follows:
of William Mitchell.
1. Where there is direct conflict
with an express regulation enState Police Power
acted by Congress acting within
to
apparently
incompatible concluits province, the local act must
sions, the Court has left little in
give way. 35
2. Where Congress has occupied the way of precedents to guide the
the field, local regulations occu- lower courts and local legislatures.
pying the same field, whether As the different modes of interdirectly or indirectly, must yield state carriage change in their relaeven though there is no conflict, tive importance, there is little
unless Congress has otherwise doubt that the ·court will view local
regulations from varying perspecprovided. 36
3. Even where Congress has not tives. The combination of these two
acted, if the subject matter is of factors makes it difficult to predict
a national character requiring the direction future decisions will
uniformity throughout the na- take, or, for that matter, to make
tion, local action tending to an accurate judgment of the effect
hamper this objective is void.37 of Huron on local regulation of in4. Where
interstate
commerce terstate carriers other than the
would be unduly burdened or Detroit Smoke Abatement Code as
restrained by local control, the applied to Great Lakes shipping.
local legislation will be struck
36. E .g., Napier v. Atlantic Coas:t
down as an obstruction to the Line Railroad co., 272 u.s. 605 (1926).
37. E.g., Southern Paclfi.c Co. v. Arlfree flow of commercial inter- zon,'l.,
326 U. S. 7 61 (19 46). Casos holding
that the state Tegulatioa was of a
course between the states.38
local chara,,ter not requiri ng -national
5. The motivating reasons under- unifonnlty Include; 1) Smltll v . Ala124 U.S. rn5 (1888). An Alalying the local action will be bama,
bama ·tatute r equiring an exam.inat!Oa
license of train engineers be.fore
scrutinized to determine whether ·and
opera.ting In the state. 2) Nashville.
or not its purpose is a valid ex- Chattanooga and t. Louis Railroad
Co. v. Al a bama, 128 U. S. 96 (1 8 ) .
ercise of the state's reserved Statute.
reQu.iring an examination of
rallroail. employees as to vision a.ad
9
powers.3
color blindn,ess. 3) New York, New
Huron and its predecessors leave Raven & Harttord Railroad Co. v. New
York, 165 U.S . 628 (1 897) . New York
much to be desired in that the statute
forblading the use of furnaces
Court has not been consistent in its or stoves i n paf!s enger trains and Tequiring r· ard posts
on railroad
application of reasoning to fact. By bridges. !l Erb. v. Mora.sch, 177 U.S.
5
4
(
1.900
.
1\Iunicipal
ordinance
limitdrawing fine lines to distinguish ing the speed o! lra.lns In a city.
6)
Atl11,ntic
Coa.,,'1:
Line
Railroad
Co.
v.
the circumstances of cases leading

Georgi.a., 234
.s. !80 (1914) . Ge orgla.
statute requiring Jectrlc hea.dHgbts on
Joco:inotl.ves.
(Prenatal Injuries)
38. B.fl., Kansas City Southern Rail31. Tha 1erm use d b y Justi ce Frank- road Co. ,·. Kaw Valley Drainage Dlsfurter In Morgan v. V ir g inia, 328 U .S. trlct, 233 U . . - 5 (1914). Court held
37 3, 388 (1946) .
im·a.lid an ord. ·r requiring th ,:aUroa,d
32. 225 U.S. a.t 783.
to remo-ve its bridges over a rlver for
33. 267 U .S. 307 (1925 ) .
flood control purposes.
3 4. 289 U. S. 92 (1933 ) .
89. E.fl., Bradl :i'" v. Public Utilities·
35. E.g., Gibbons v . Ogden, 22 U.S. Com.mlssion of Ohio, 289 U.S. 92
(9 Wheat.) 1 {1824).
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